First Impressions: The Fall of the Roman Empire

Scholars and amateurs have pondered – often weak and weary - over the fate of SPQR – the Roman empire. One such scholar has added his deceptively simple thesis that the Western empire fell due to a collapse of military power.

It's a little more complicated than that but Arther Ferrill makes a reasonable case that two key changes in military and strategic posture made by Constantine put the Western empire in a militarily vulnerable position which continued to deteriorate as the west plunged toward 476.

Specifically, the allegedly Christian emperor abandoned the preclusive perimeter defensive strategy used so successfully for centuries, in favor of defense-in-depth which relied upon central reserves dispatched to trouble spots as needed. Previously, troops were stationed along the frontiers to meet threats in real-time with required temporary re-allocations made from other locations until the vulnerable location stabilized.

Ferrill contends that this change in strategy was motivated by political concerns rather than military ones. In other words, Constantine wanted a strong military close at hand as a deterrent to any pretenders to the throne – something with which he was all too familiar as a pretender himself.

The change in posture coincided with an increase in military failures starting with Persia under Julian in 361 and not long after at Adrianople in 378 which was a watershed year which ushered in a long decline associated with the influx of Barbarians into the army whose lower tactical standards corrupted those of the Romans.

In Ferrill's view, traditional Roman tactics of close battlefield formations only succeeded due to the strict discipline of the Roman troops. When training declined, this tactic became a liability rather than an advantage, rendering the Roman soldier little different than the barbarian – a characteristic which became egregious during the 5^th century.

There is considerably more to Ferrill's theory, but I would like to move to broader considerations which the professor touches upon but does not dwell. While acknowledging the myriad explanations offered down the centuries – 210 of them at one count, he waives them away with cursory discussion. I am not disturbed by this dismissal, but it opens the question of root causes.

For example, he mentions depopulation as immaterial but I think he is mistaken as he is with population replacement.

Ferrill frequently cites shortfalls in filling the ranks of the legions, especially in the last 50 years of the West, a problem exacerbated by loss of territories. While not necessarily a depopulation problem per se, it is related. The solution was to incorporate Germans in such numbers that near the end the Western Roman army was nothing but barbarians – and their laxer standards of training and discipline.

Yet demographics is even more culpable in the decline of Rome. We have mentioned in past Chronicles the writings of Dr Ernest Martin on the sea change in the racial demographics of Rome starting in the 2d century after waves of slaves from the oriental regions began to replace the old Etruscan stock.

It was these Etruscans who conquered the empire, but when they diminished so did the intellectual caliber and psychology of the population and its leaders.

For example, where in the late empire were Ovid, Juvenal, Seneca, Tacitus, et. al? Instead Romans got Eusebius and Augustin. The neo-Roman intellect was simply incapable of maintaining its inheritance.

This inferior intellect is seen in the quality of leaders. Where was the Augustus, Trajan, or Marcus Aurelius for the late empire? Instead Rome got Constantine, Theodosius, and an assortment of dirt bags. Although Diocletian brought stability to the empire, it was at the cost of multiple co-rulers who ended up fighting each other until one prevailed. After Theodosius, the split in the empire was permanent except for one brief interlude.

Ferrill documents the many battles between Eastern and Western rulers from Constantine down to the end, emperors who could ill afford the drain of men and resources as the onslaught of barbarians turned into an avalanche which totally ruined the Western Empire. In no way could these unlettered primitives maintain the Roman culture, and their petty venal interests were no match for an empire demanding principle and statesmanship.

As an aside, one helpful observation Ferrill makes is that any cause for a Roman fall must also consider that the Eastern Empire, Byzantium, continued for 1000 years more. So what was it about lead pipes, for example, which did not affect the East in the same fashion as the West?

In conclusion, I respect Ferris’ implication of military weakness as the proximate cause of the collapse of the Western Empire, but the demographic and racial disintegrations get closer to the root of the Western collapse. Considering the East-West dialectic, my explanation is that the Eastern empire was a smaller and more manageable geography requiring less intellect and imagination to rule, and that the East had deeper financial reserves and resources to withstand incompetence.

Reference
Arther Ferrill, The Fall of the Roman Empire, Thames and Hudson, New York, c. 1986,  192pp

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